Semantics and pragmatics of a Japanese discourse marker *dakara* (*so/in other words*): a unitary account

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**Abstract**

In this paper, I discuss the information encoded by the Japanese discourse connective *dakara*, and claim that the fundamental function of the connective is to mark the utterance that follows it as an *interpretive representation* of another (set of) utterance(s)/assumption(s): for instance, as a reformulation or a contextual implication of another (set of) utterance(s)/assumption(s). Unlike most existing accounts of *dakara* which see the connective as being polysemous, the present approach provides a unitary account, where the notion of *interpretive resemblance* [Relevance (1986)] plays a crucial role. Furthermore, using, as a point of departure, Blakemore’s analyses of English reformulation markers such as *in other words*, as well as her work on English discourse connectives such as *so* and *therefore*, I will argue that *dakara* is better analyzed as encoding procedural information instructing the hearer to identify a (set of) representation(s) which interpretively resembles the utterance introduced by the connective. By guiding the construction of appropriate higher-level representations of the utterance, the connective contributes to the explicit side of communication. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

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**1. Introduction**

The main aim of this paper is to provide a unitary, and cognitively sound, account of the notorious Japanese discourse connective *dakara*. Past analyses of *dakara* agree that it encodes a range of meanings which are sensitive to the discourse environment, although claims about exactly how many different functions it has range between 2 and 8...
(cf. Hamada, 1997; Hasunuma, 1991; Maynard, 1993; Nagata, 1971; Naka, 1983; Nomura, 1981; Tanizaki, 1994; Yokobayashi and Shimomura, 1988). As illustrated in the section which immediately follows, based on the functions most commonly mentioned by scholars, a typical list of senses encoded by *dakara* includes: (i) a logical relation between two propositions, (ii) a causal relation between two states of affairs, (iii) an epistemic-causal relation between two propositions, and (iv) a causal relation between a proposition expressed by an utterance and a speech-act performed by another utterance.1

More recently, an additional non-causal relation between utterances encoded by *dakara* has started gaining scholarly attention: the non-causal use of *dakara* to introduce an utterance that is interpreted as a reformulation of the previous utterance (cf. Hamada, 1997; Hasunuma, 1991; Maynard, 1993). Elaborating on Hamada’s (1997) insights concerning the non-causal use of *dakara*, I will propose that this function of introducing a reformulation of another utterance/assumption is the most fundamental function of *dakara*, and all other seemingly different interpretations of the connective follow from it.2

I will argue that the fundamental function of the connective is to mark an utterance that follows as an *interpretive representation* of another (set of) utterance(s)/assumption(s): for instance, as a reformulation or a contextual implication of another (set of) utterance(s)/assumption(s). *Interpretive resemblance*, initially defined by Sperber and Wilson (1986), refers to a relationship between representations (e.g. thoughts, utterances, propositions) defined by sharing of logical and contextual implications: the more implications representations share, the more they resemble each other (cf. also Noh, 1998; Wilson, 2000; Wilson and Sperber, 1993). Furthermore, using Blakemore’s relevance-theoretic analyses of reformulation markers in English (Blakemore, 1993, 1996, 1997), as well as her work on English discourse connectives (Blakemore, 1987, 1988, 1992) as a point of departure, I will suggest that *dakara* encodes procedural information which constrains the derivation of both implicatures and higher-level explicatures (cf. Matsui, 2000; Takeuchi, 1998).

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1 As discussed later in this paper, Blakemore distinguishes markers introducing elaboration/reformulation of another utterance, such as *in other words*, from discourse connectives introducing contextual implications, such as *so*. I opt for extending Blakemore’s analysis of reformulation markers to cover cases of *dakara* introducing contextual implication, by appealing to the notion of interpretive resemblance, which is defined by sharing of implications. Let me note, however, that it seems also possible to analyze *dakara* as equivalent to *so* in English, following Blakemore’s analysis of the connective as introducing contextual implication, and somehow find a way to extend the analysis to cover reformulation or repetition cases (personal communication with Deirdre Wilson). In fact, the distinction between introducing a reformulation of another utterance, and introducing a contextual implication of another utterance is not always so clear-cut – the speaker might elaborate a previous utterance by explicating the contextual implication of the utterance. For example, in the following example from Blakemore (1993:107), *in other words* in the last utterance can be replaced by *so*:

(a) A: How did you get on with your semantics this week?  
(b) B: Well, I couldn’t get any of the books from the library.  
(c) A: In other words, you didn’t do the reading.

What is crucial here, however, is that regardless of which option is selected, the same conclusion that *dakara* contributes to higher-level explicatures, rather than implicatures is reached.

2 This is based on an example cited in Tanizaki (1994: 87).
As will be shown below, most existing accounts of *dakara* claim that the connective is polysemous. However, the account argued here is a unitary one, in which pragmatic inferences play a much more substantial role than in polysemous alternatives. Here, I am motivated by the following hypothesis about human cognition, which I assume without argument, following Grice’s ‘Modified Occam’s Razor’ (Grice, 1989:47): if it is possible to have a unitary account, this is to be preferred to a polysemy account on the basis of cognitive economy concerning storage of lexical information. In this paper, I demonstrate that a unitary account of *dakara* is indeed possible if one takes a relevance-theoretic view of utterance understanding, in which the consideration of cognitive economy extends to pragmatic phases of utterance interpretation.

The unitary account presented here is also motivated by another hypothesis concerning human cognition: that human minds are equipped with the ability to handle a variety of metarepresentations, namely, public representations (e.g. utterances), mental representations (e.g. thoughts), and abstract representations (e.g. propositions) (cf. Noh, 1998; Sperber, 1997, 2000; Wilson, 2000). The notion of interpretive resemblance in relevance theory is thought to be the key notion required to explain how the mind can deal with all types of metarepresentation; this is possible because the mind is capable of exploiting the resemblance between representations. This idea, if proven correct, would naturally strengthen the unitary account of *dakara* presented here. The existence of connectives like *dakara* naturally follows once we accept that the mind is geared to take advantage of interpretive resemblance between representations.

2. Dakara—examples

This section introduces example utterances which show how *dakara* is used and understood, using the five labels commonly employed to classify the different functions of the connective: (i) logical implication, (ii) cause-consequence relation, (iii) premise-conclusion (epistemic-causal) relation, (iv) speech-act causation relation, and (v) reformulation relation. English equivalents of *dakara* are provided to illustrate as clearly as possible what is going on in each example. In order to make it easier for non-Japanese speakers to grasp the relationship between propositions in each example, utterances are given in English except for the connective *dakara*. Those who are interested in Japanese can refer to the Appendix, where all the utterances in examples (1) through (12) are given in Japanese.

2.1. The logical implication interpretation

(1) Taro: Let’s go to the lake.
    Mariko: You don’t have a vehicle.
    Taro: I have a bicycle. *Dakara* (Therefore/So/In other words) I have a vehicle.

2.2. The cause-consequence interpretation

(2) [Mariko says to Taro]
I don’t have the key. Dakara (Therefore/So/In other words) we can’t get into the house through the door.

2.3. The premise-conclusion (or epistemic-causal) interpretation

(3) Mariko: The adulterous Oxford Don was murdered at home last night. Taro: The wife is always the first suspect in these cases. Mariko: His wife was in Paris when he was murdered. Dakara (Therefore/So/In other words) she couldn’t have done it.

(4) is a case where the conclusion is reached by someone other than the speaker of the utterance interpreted as the premise.

(4) Mariko: There are so few trains to and from my station and there is no bus service from the station to my street which is rather distant...
Taro: Dakara (So/In other words) you want to say that you need a car, right?³

2.4. The ‘speech-act causation’ interpretation

(5) is a typical example of ‘speech-act causation/enablement’ in Sweetser’s (1990) sense. The fact that the speaker has two tickets for the men’s final at Wimbledon causes/enables him to suggest that the hearer should cancel her appointment and come to the match with him.

(5) Taro: Are you free next Saturday afternoon?
Mariko: I have to see my hairstylist.
Taro: Today, I was given two tickets for the men’s final at Wimbledon. Dakara (So/In other words) why don’t you cancel your appointment?

Now, (6) is a more complicated example where no utterance precedes the utterance introduced by dakara. Here, a set of assumptions, rather than an utterance, needs to be connected to the dakara-utterance, and the hearer has to provide these assumptions inferentially.

(6) [Mariko and Taro are stuck in a traffic jam]
Mariko: Dakara (This is why/See?) I said we should go by train.

(7) is a case where the speech act plays the role of the premise, rather than the conclusion.

(7) [Mother always checks if her son is doing homework]
Mother: Are you doing your homework?
Son: Dakara (Can’t you see?) I am doing it now.⁴

2.5. Reformulation or repetition interpretation

(8) Mariko: What are you cooking?

³ This is based on an example cited in Tanizaki (1994: 90).
⁴ This is based on an example cited in Hasunuma (1991: 145–146).
Taro: Sparrow tongues with anchovies.
Mariko: What?
Taro: Dakara (Like I said) Sparrow tongues with anchovies.

(9) Mariko: Let’s meet at the usual place.
Taro: At the usual place?
Mariko: Dakara (You know/In other words), at the back gate.

(10) President: I wasn’t there when the decision was made.
Chairman: What does that mean?
President: Dakara (It means) I am not responsible.

(11) Mariko: I will go with you, after all.
Taro: You can’t. We are going to talk about business.
Mariko: Who are you going to see?
Taro: Dakara (Can’t you see?/What do you think?) a business colleague.⁵

⁵ There are cases of dakara which might be understood as something like as a result of that, or that is why, as in the following example:

(a)0 Amai mono o tabesugimasita. Dakara 0
(I) sweet thing ACC ate-overly so (I)
hutottesimaimasita.
fat-adversity-became
‘I have been eating too many sweets. As a result of that/That is why I gained some weight, unfortunately.’

One of the questions which might arise here is whether dakara in (a) which connects two utterances (or propositions) describing states of affairs should be analyzed as encoding conceptual, cause-consequence, information. Those who view the connective as polysemous would say that dakara in this example encodes a cause-consequence relation which is distinct from, say, dakara used in the reformulation cases. Here, I share the intuition that there is some sort of causal connotation derived from the use of dakara in (a), which is absent in reformulation cases. However, I do not think that this observation is necessarily incompatible with the monosemous approach taken here. One can take the view that dakara encodes the same procedural information in all cases, and the causal connotation can be seen as being added (as part of the enrichment process) during the development of the higher-level explicatures of the utterance. I tend to believe that generally, the content of higher-level explicatures triggered by dakara may vary according to the expected cognitive effects of the utterance and the accessibility of contextual assumptions in a given context. For example, the higher-level explicatures of (a) may include both (a’) and (a’”):

(a’) [The speaker] believes that ‘[the speaker] gained some weight’ is a contextual implication of ‘[the speaker] has been eating too many sweets’.
(a’”) The speaker believes that it is a consequence of eating too many sweets that the speaker gained some weight.

These final higher-level representations can be seen as the output of interaction between the procedural information encoded by dakara and the hearer’s interpretation that the two utterances in (a) achieve relevance as a description of states of affairs.
3. Past studies of *dakara*

There are two main approaches in traditional Japanese linguistics to analyzing the semantics of Japanese connectives. The first, advocated by Sakuma (1940), Mikami (1953) and Watanabe (1971), among others, views the function of connectives as guiding the hearer to interpret the utterance preceded by a connective in the way the speaker intended. The second, proposed by Tokieda (1941), Tsukahara (1958), and others, suggests that connectives communicate the speaker’s personal attitude concerning the proposition communicated. Interestingly, it is not impossible to draw a parallel between the first approach and Blakemore’s procedural account of discourse connectives, and between the second approach and Grice’s conceptual approach (cf. Blakemore, 1987, 1992; Grice, 1975; Wilson and Sperber, 1993).

More recent analyses of *dakara* by Yokobayashi and Shimomura (1988), Maynard (1993), Hasunuma (1991), and Hamada (1997) seem to reflect the second approach. For example, Yokobayashi and Shimomura (1988: 21) give the following definition of *dakara*: “*dakara* expresses the speaker’s judgment that the facts or events occur as a natural result of the facts and events described in the preceding position”. The notion of subjectivity also plays an important role in Maynard’s account of *dakara*. She suggests that *dakara* has multiple functions which can be divided into two categories. The first connects two propositions, bearing the meaning of cause/reason-result/consequence, as illustrated in our example (3). The second also connects two propositions, but at the same time, adds either the speech act of explaining or justifying, or an attitude of irritation about the fact that relevant information is already given but repeated anyway. An important characteristic of *dakara* used in the latter function, Maynard claims, is that the two propositions seem to bear no clear causal relationship, and *dakara* should be analyzed as communicating the speaker’s subjective voice. She calls this type of use of the connective ‘explanatory *dakara*’, as opposed to ‘cause-result *dakara*’.

Maynard’s analysis of *dakara* seems adequate enough to provide accurate intuitions about the description of the connective. However, her overall framework falls short of an explanatory account. For example, the question of why *dakara* seems to have multiple functions (one at the propositional level and another at the level of subjective modality), but nevertheless can be plausibly posited as a single linguistic entity, is not addressed. Also, the question of how exactly the hearer could recover, for example, the speech act of explanation or sometimes the attitude of irritation, if these are not encoded conceptually, is not discussed. In the following section, I will illustrate one way of providing answers to these questions using a relevance-theoretic framework.

Finally, let me briefly mention Hamada (1997), who is one of the very few who make an attempt to provide a unitary account of *dakara*. Her main claim is that the
most essential function of *dakara* is to connect the information P as a premise and the information Q as the interpretation of the premise. Hamada defines the term ‘interpretation’ as follows: for Q to be the interpretation of P, Q should be the output of either one of the following processes involving P as a premise: deduction, abstraction, or specification (1997: 105). In her framework, P and Q can be the content of an utterance or an assumption available from non-linguistic context. In relevance-theoretic terms, what Hamada envisages as P and Q are either the propositional form, the explicature, or the implicature of an utterance. In short, Hamada sees *dakara* as being used to introduce an utterance which can be interpreted as the logical/cause consequence, conclusion, or elaboration of another utterance or an assumption available from non-linguistic context. Although the details of her account seem to require further elaboration and revision, I believe she is on the right track and her account is full of illuminating insights, some of which are shared and developed in the present account.

4. Toward a unitary account

Here I present a relevance-theoretic account of *dakara*, in which the connective is characterized as follows: *dakara* introduces an utterance which is relevant as an interpretation of an abstract proposition, an utterance, or a thought, which is mutually manifest to the speaker and the hearer. In other words, the connective overtly indicates that the utterance it introduces has a source representation which it metarepresents, and with which it shares at least one implication. Later, I discuss whether the connective should be analyzed as contributing to the explicit or the implicit side of communication, and whether it should be analyzed as encoding procedural or conceptual information. But first, I begin with a brief explanation of some of the relevance-theoretic notions which are essential to the unitary account of *dakara* presented here.

4.1. The notion of interpretive resemblance

One of the most insightful hypotheses about utterance understanding in Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory is that human beings have the cognitive capacity to entertain and represent utterances or thoughts not only as descriptions of states of affairs, but also, and more fundamentally, as interpretations of other utterances and thoughts. In this framework, every utterance is an interpretation of some thought of the speaker’s. In terms of the relation between the speaker’s thought and what it represents, the speaker’s thought can be used either interpretively or descriptively. It is used interpretively when it metarepresents further thoughts or utterances which it resembles interpretively. It is used descriptively when it represents a state of affairs as a true description of that state of affairs. Here, to metarepresent a representation means to embed a representation within a higher-level representation, as in (13):

(13) a. John said that he is the happiest man in the world.
    b. John believes that he is the happiest man in the world.
c. **John does not believe** that he is the happiest man in the world.
d. **Mary believes that John said that** he is the happiest man in the world.
e. **Mary believes that John does not believe that** he is the happiest man in the world.

I will hereafter concentrate on the interpretive use. Interpretive resemblance is thought of as resemblance in content—in other words, resemblance in terms of shared implications. It is claimed that two representations resemble each other in a context to the extent that they share logical and contextual implications. Also, interpretive resemblance is a comparative notion. That is, any two representations can more or less resemble each other, including two extreme possibilities in which they have no, or complete, resemblance. When one utterance or thought is used interpretively to metarepresent another one which shares all its implications, Sperber and Wilson call it a *literal interpretation* of that other thought or utterance.

An interpretive use of an utterance or thought is seen to involve three distinct cognitive abilities, depending on the properties of the original it interprets: these are metapsychological, metacommunicative, and metalogical abilities (cf. Noh, 1998; Sperber, 1997; Wilson, 2000). When the original is a mental representation, e.g. a thought, then to metarepresent it involves metapsychological abilities. When the original is a public representation such as an utterance, to metarepresent it involves metacommunicative abilities. When the original is an abstract representation, e.g. a sentence or a proposition, to metarepresent it requires metalogical abilities. These three types of abilities are illustrated in (14a), (14b), and (14c) respectively:

(14) a. Mary intends me to believe that human beings have linguistic genes.
    b. Mary said that human beings have linguistic genes.
    c. It cannot be proven that human beings have linguistic genes.

Whereas metapsychological and metacommunicative abilities share the capacity to handle attributed representations, i.e. thoughts or utterances attributed to someone other than the speaker, or attributed to the speaker at some other time, the metalogical ability deals only with non-attributive representations characterized as linguistic, logical, or conceptual. Thus, interpretive representations consist of subtly different varieties which can be categorized in at least two ways. First, depending on the properties of the original, they can be divided into three kinds: metapsychological, metacommunicative, and metalogical. Second, they can also be categorized by the distinction between attributive and non-attributive cases.

Finally, let me briefly mention the echoic use of interpretive representations. In relevance theory, when a metarepresentation is used to express the speaker’s attitude to the original representation, it is seen as a case of echoic use, as in (15):

(15) a. Peter: It’s a perfect day for the outdoor concert.
    [They go to the concert and the sun shines]
    Mary (Happily): It’s a perfect day for the outdoor concert, indeed.
b. Peter: It’s a perfect day for the outdoor concert.
   [They go to the concert and it rains]
   Mary (Sarcastically): It’s a perfect day for the outdoor concert, indeed.

It has been pointed out that often, *dakara* expresses an attitude of irritation about the fact the speaker has to repeat or reformulate something believed to have already been communicated. Later, I will suggest that this attitude of irritation might be seen as the expression of a dissociative attitude to the utterance or thought which requests the restatement or reformulation of a previous utterance.

4.2. Interpretation of ‘interpretation’

When an utterance is used interpretively, there is often no indication that it is used interpretively. Moreover, the nature of the original it interprets—i.e. whether this is an utterance, a thought, a proposition, or a linguistic representation—is also typically left implicit. Finally, if the original is an attributive representation, the person to whom it implicitly is attributed might need to be identified. Thus, it is clear that pragmatic inferences play a substantial role in interpreting an utterance which is an interpretation of another representation.

Relevance theory provides an account of how these pragmatic inferences are constrained so that the hearer is able to understand the utterance in the way intended by the speaker. For instance, the search for relevance enables the hearer to enrich metarepresentations. Consider the following example:

(16) Mary: So what did Jane say about the party?
    Peter: a. She said that it was fantastic.
           b. It was fantastic. (Noh, 1998: 105)

Here, (16a) is a case of overt metarepresentation. The intended interpretation is that Jane said that the party was fantastic. Let us suppose that (16b), on the other hand, a case of tacit metarepresentation, is intended to be understood as a faithful representation of what Jane said. Then (16b) needs to be pragmatically enriched to express the same explicature as (16a), i.e. that Jane said that it was fantastic. Relevance theory predicts that if the most relevant information for Mary at that point is what Jane said at the party, Mary is likely to interpret (16b) as expressing ‘Jane said that it was fantastic’, choosing the optimally relevant interpretation. The full intended interpretation of (16b) will then be something like: Peter says/believes that Jane said that it was fantastic.

4.3. Dakara—a new analysis

Returning to the examples of *dakara* introduced earlier, we can now consider a new analysis of these, based on the hypothesis that the connective’s sole function is to indicate that the utterance it introduces is a case of interpretive use—typically a reformulation of the original.
The first example, in which *dakara* is seen to receive a ‘logical implication interpretation’, might be explained as involving interpretive resemblance between two abstract propositions. In other words, it is a case of metalogical, non-attributive, interpretive use:

(1) Taro: Let’s go to the lake.
   Mariko: You don’t have a vehicle.
   Taro: I have a bicycle. *Dakara*, I have a vehicle.

The two propositions ‘Taro has a bicycle’ and ‘Taro has a vehicle’ share an analytic implication: that is, ‘Taro has a bicycle’ entails ‘Taro has a vehicle’. The contextual effects of the *dakara*-utterance would hence be, for example, to communicate that what Mariko said is not true.

Example (2), in which *dakara* is taken to express a ‘cause-consequence’ relation, may be explained in terms of interpretive resemblance between the proposition expressed by the one utterance and the proposition expressed by the other:

(2) [Mariko says to Taro]
   I don’t have the key. *Dakara*, we can’t get into the house through the door.

The source proposition, which is descriptively used, implies the proposition used interpretively. The two mental representations connected by *dakara* in these examples share contextual implications. Suppose that the utterances in (2) are interpreted in a context consisting of the following assumptions:

(17) a. If the speaker doesn’t have the key for the door, she can’t open the door.
    b. If she can’t open the door, they can’t enter the house through the door.
    c. If they can’t enter the house through the door, then they have to break the window.

In the context (17), the proposition, ‘the speaker does not have the key for the door’, and the proposition, ‘they can’t enter the house through the door’, share two implications: that they cannot enter the house through the door, and that they have to break the window. In fact, the proposition ‘they can’t enter the house through the door’ is the contextual implication of the first utterance in this context. Thus, in terms of the notion of resemblance, in this case, the utterance introduced by *dakara* expresses a proposition which is identical to a contextual implication of the source utterance. What is communicated by the interpretive utterance might be something like the following:

(18) Mariko believes that ‘Mariko and Taro can’t enter [the house] through [the door]’ is a contextual implication of ‘Mariko does not have [the key] for [the door]’.

The contextual effect of this utterance might be to suggest that they have to break the window.
Let us move on to examples (3) and (4), in which *dakara* might be seen to communicate the epistemic-causal relation:

(3) Mariko: The adulterous Oxford Don was murdered at home last night. 
Taro: The wife is always the first suspect in these cases. 
Mariko: His wife was in Paris when he was murdered. *Dakara*, she couldn’t have done it.

(4) Mariko: There are so few trains to and from my station and there is no bus service from the station to my street which is rather distant...
Taro: *Dakara*, you want to say that you need a car, right?

The crucial point in these cases is that mental representations, i.e. beliefs, rather than abstract propositions, are interpretively involved. However, (3) and (4) are also different in important respects. In (3), the utterance introduced by *dakara* is used to represent the speaker’s own interpretation of the proposition ‘[His wife] was in Paris when he was murdered’. More specifically, it represents a conclusion the speaker deduces from the proposition—namely, the speaker’s belief that the Don could not have been killed by his wife. On the other hand, in (4), the second utterance is the hearer’s interpretation of the first utterance as a whole, i.e. the explicatures and implicatures of the utterance. In other words, Taro elaborates on what Mariko said.

Now let us look at the examples in which *dakara* might be interpreted as expressing ‘speech-act causation’:

(5) Taro: Are you free next Saturday afternoon? 
Mariko: I have to see my hairstylist. 
Taro: Today, I was given two tickets for the men’s final at Wimbledon. *Dakara*, why don’t you cancel your appointment?

(6) [Mariko and Taro are stuck in a traffic jam] 
Mariko: *Dakara*, I said we should go by train.

(7) [Mother always checks if her son is doing homework] 
Mother: Are you doing your homework? 
Son: *Dakara*, I am doing it now.

In (5), the utterance introduced by *dakara* might be taken as a suggestion that Mariko should cancel her appointment so that she can come and watch the men’s final at Wimbledon with Taro. Here, the original representation metarepresented by that utterance is the preceding utterance. More specifically, it is the proposition expressed by the utterance, ‘the speaker was given two tickets for the men’s final at Wimbledon at time t’. The utterance following *dakara* can be interpreted as representing the speaker’s propositional attitude that it is desirable for Taro that Mariko cancels her appointment and come to the match with him.

Now for (6), the source representation interpreted by the utterance introduced by *dakara* seems to be more than one, and of more than one type. Here it seems that
there are at least three layers of source representation for the utterance ‘dakara she said that they should go by train’. The first layer of source representation is the speaker’s thought that if they go by car, the car will end up being stuck in the traffic jam. The second layer of source representation is the speaker’s utterance, which in fact is an interpretation of her thought mentioned in the previous sentence, i.e. that they should go by train. The third layer of source representation is her descriptive thoughts that in the end they came by car at the hearer’s insistence, and that the car is currently stuck in the traffic jam. Here, in order to understand the utterance introduced by dakara, the hearer has to inferentially provide all these representations. Only then do contextual effects such as that the speaker is criticising the hearer’s poor decision, and that the speaker is a better judge, become accessible.

In example (7), the source representation is, first of all, the propositional attitude communicated by mother’s utterance ‘Are you doing your homework?’ This interrogative utterance may be interpreted as communicating the mother’s attitude that a positive answer would be desirable, hence, relevant, to herself and possibly to the son. In other words, it communicates that she finds it desirable that her son does his homework. So the utterance introduced by dakara can be taken as the interpretation of that propositional attitude of hers. But there seems to be something more going on here. Intuitively, the son’s utterance also communicates that he knew in advance that the mother would ask the question, which suggests that her asking the question is habitual and he is quite irritated by that. In a relevance-theoretic framework, his utterance might be taken as being echoic. That is, he communicates his dissociative attitude towards the mother’s attitude that it is desirable that he does his homework.

Finally, let us look at the examples in which the utterances introduced by dakara may be interpreted as providing an elaboration, summary, restatement, or repetition, of the original.

(8) Mariko: What are you cooking?  
Taro: Sparrow tongues with anchovies. 
Mariko: What? 
Taro: Dakara, Sparrow tongues with anchovies.

(9) Mariko: Let’s meet at the usual place. 
Taro: At the usual place?  
Mariko: Dakara, at the back gate.

(10) President: I wasn’t there when the decision was made.  
Chairman: What does that mean? 
President: Dakara, I am not responsible.

(11) Mariko: I will go with you, after all.  
Taro: You can’t. We are going to talk about business. 
Mariko: Who are you going to see? 
Taro: Dakara, a business colleague.
(12) [Mother has repeatedly told her daughter, Keiko, not to go to a certain club late night]
   Mother: Keiko, you went to that club again yesterday, right?
   Keiko: Dakara?

In example (8), the utterance following dakara simply repeats Taro’s first utterance, as an answer to Mariko’s question. In other words, the two representations are identical, of which the first utterance, i.e. the public representation, is the source representation. However, the utterance also communicates that Taro has already provided the answer to the question, and that he feels irritated by her asking the question, which was unnecessary in his mind. Thus, again, this might be seen as an instance of echoic use. In other words, the dakara-utterance not only represents the interpretation of Taro’s own utterance, but also the interpretation of Mariko’s question, to which, in Taro’s mind, the answer is given. Thus, the dakara-utterance is echoic in the sense that it expresses a dissociative attitude towards Mariko’s question. Intuitively, in order to understand the utterance introduced by dakara, one needs the assumptions shown in (19):

(19) a. Mariko believes that Taro is cooking [what].
   a. Mariko believes that she does not have the value for [what] in her belief that Taro is cooking [what].
   b. Taro does not believe that Mary does not have the value for [what] in her belief that Taro is cooking [what].
   c. Taro believes that the proposition ‘Taro is cooking Sparrow tongues and anchovies’ is an identical representation of the proposition ‘Taro is cooking Sparrow tongues and anchovies’.

In examples (9) and (10), dakara introduces an utterance which might be interpreted as a reformulation/elaboration of the preceding utterance. As the source representation is an utterance, these examples of dakara are also cases of meta-communicative interpretive use. According to Blakemore (1993: 107), typically, the reformulation achieves relevance by narrowing down the interpretation of the original or facilitating the hearer’s understanding of the original. The contextual effects of the reformulated utterances in (9) and (10) can be found along these lines.

In example (11), the utterance introduced by dakara does not provide a straightforward elaboration of the previous utterance by the same speaker. This is clearly indicated by the question, ‘Who are you going to see?’, asked by Mariko. Still, as the connective dakara indicates that the utterance following it is the interpretation of some other representation, the hearer has to identify it. Given that there is no other contextual assumption accessible to the hearer, the most accessible candidate for the source representation is the previous utterance by the same speaker. Thus, the utterance introduced by dakara in (11) communicates that Taro is going to see a business colleague and that this information interpretively resembles his previous utterance that he and someone else are going to talk about business. Again, the dakara utterance also communicates Taro’s attitude of dissociation towards the
question. Thus, to understand this utterance, assumptions such as those in (20) might be necessary:

(20)  
  a. Mariko believes that Taro is going to see someone.  
  b. Mariko believes that she doesn’t know whom Taro is going to see.  
  c. Taro believes that if Taro is going to talk about business with someone, then this person is a business colleague.  
  d. Taro believes that the proposition that ‘Taro is meeting a business colleague’ is a reformulation of ‘Taro is going talk about business with someone.’  
  e. Taro believes that Mariko should know that Taro is going to see a business colleague. 

In example (12), dakara is used to ask for clarification of the content of the first utterance. Having been told that she shouldn’t go to the club repeatedly, the speaker of the utterance, Keiko, in fact knows well what her mother really wanted to say. So, her interrogative utterance ‘Dakara?’ is more like a rhetorical question. By asking a question for which she and her mother both know she has an answer, her utterance also communicates the attitude that she finds the conversation rather pointless.

4.4. Semantics of dakara: explicit–implicit and conceptual–procedural distinctions

Now I will consider the question of whether dakara contributes to the explicit or the implicit side of communication. In relevance theory, contextual assumptions seen as implied premises and conclusions are considered to belong to the implicit dimension of communication, and are classified as ‘implicatures’. On the other hand, inferences that contribute to the construction of the proposition—i.e. that are used to enrich the logical form, to disambiguate ambiguous expressions, or to assign a referent to a referring expression—are considered to belong to the explicit dimension of communication. Such inferences are distinguished from implicatures on the grounds that they contribute to the truth-conditional content of an utterance (cf. Carston, 1988, 1998). Thus, both linguistically encoded/decoded entities and inferentially provided ones are characterized as contributing to ‘explicatures’, as long as their function is to construct a representation of the complete proposition expressed by an utterance. Furthermore, in addition to this basic level of explicature, there is higher-level explicature, which is seen as another facet of the explicit dimension of communication. This consists of the representation of speech act and propositional attitude, and is considered as the extension of the development of the logical form of an utterance. Higher-level explicature is similar to basic explicature in the sense that its content is representational, but it is different from basic explicature because it doesn’t contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterance, or, one might say, because it has a separate truth-condition in its own right.

One thing which is obvious is that dakara does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of an utterance. One possible analysis of this, given the relevance-theoretic dichotomy between explicit/implicit communication, would be to categorize
dakara as contributing to higher-level explicatures, alongside illocutionary adverbials such as frankly and seriously and attitudinal adverbials such as unfortunately and regrettably. An alternative would be to categorize it as contributing to implicatures, alongside discourse connectives such as so, after all, and moreover (cf. Blakemore, 1987, 1992; Ifantidou, 1993; Rouchota, 1998; Wilson, 1992; Wilson and Sperber, 1993).

Blakemore’s analysis of reformulation markers in English such as that is and in other words, provides useful insights for the analysis of dakara. She claims that a reformulation achieves relevance as an interpretation of the thought communicated by the original utterance. More specifically, she claims that the relevance of a reformulation of an utterance is achieved through a higher-level explicature of the sort similar to (21) (Blakemore, 1996: 340):

(21) The speaker believes that P is a faithful representation of a thought Q.

Thus, according to Blakemore, reformulation markers such as that is and in other words introduce “a distinct discourse unit or speech act whose relevance lies in the way it leads the hearer to recover a proposition of the form [(21)] as a higher level explication of the host utterance” (1996: 340).

If my analysis of dakara as a marker of interpretive representations is on target, then dakara may be analyzed as having a function similar to that is and in other words in English. Following Blakemore’s claim that what is communicated by markers of interpretive representation is expressed in the form of a higher-level explicature of the utterance, I propose, without further argument, that dakara contributes to the explicit side of communication.

But what about the distinction between conceptual and procedural encoding? Here, I am simply adopting the existing assumption in relevance theory that there are two types of information which can be encoded by linguistic elements: conceptual, or representational, information and procedural, or computational, information (Blakemore, 1987, 1992; Wilson and Sperber, 1993). Procedural information is typically thought of as information about how to manipulate conceptual representation. Prototypical examples include discourse connectives such as so, after all, and however (Blakemore, 1987).

Blakemore (1996) claims that English reformulation markers such as that is to say and in other words encode conceptual information. This provides a clear contrast to her account of discourse connectives (Blakemore, 1987), where these are seen to encode procedural information to constrain the implicatures of the utterance. She presents several arguments as to why reformulation markers should be treated as conceptual, in which synonymous conceptual counterparts such as the following are discussed as evidence:

(22) a. That is the same as saying I’m fired.
b. He asked me to put it in other words.

Following Sperber and Wilson’s argument for illocutionary adverbials, Blakemore suggests that the reformulation markers and their truth-conditional counterparts
encode the same concepts, although in the case of the former, the concepts they encode do not contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterances which they introduce.

If *dakara* encodes conceptual information like *that is* and *in other words* in English, it should share the property of compositionality, and conceptual counterparts should exist. First, let us take the issue of compositionality. In terms of compositionality and productivity, *dakara* has very limited capacity, as shown below:

(23) a. *Kare wa kimi o aisiteita. Dakara koso kare wa kimi kara satta.*
   he TOP you ACC loved focus he TOP you from left
   ‘He loved you. SO/THEREFORE(emphatic stress), he left you.’

b. *Kare wa kimi kara satta. Dakara to itte, kare ga kimio aisiteinakatta*
   he TOP you from left that say-and he TOP you ACC loved-not
   to iu wake dewanai.
   that say the-case is-not
   ‘He left you. I am saying “so/therefore/in other words”, but it does not follow that he didn’t love you.’

c. *Kare wa kimi kara satta. Dakara to iu wake dewanai ga, kare wa*
   he TOP you from left that say the-case is-not but he TOP
   totonemonai otoko da.
   terrible man is
   ‘He left you. I wouldn’t use “so/therefore/in other words” here, but he is still a bastard’

?d. 0 *Dakara dewanai.*
   (it) is-not
   ‘It is not “therefore/in other words’

In (23a), the utterance introduced by *dakara* roughly means ‘That is exactly why he left you’. *Koso* is a focus particle used typically when it is presumed to be difficult for the hearer to retrieve required assumptions to interpret the utterance following *dakara*. In (23b) and (23c), *dakara* is followed by ‘to iu’ which means ‘say that’ in English. The utterance introduced by the connective in (23b) serves as a hedge and roughly means that even if I say ‘*dakara*’ here, it does not follow that he didn’t love you. In (23c), the second utterance communicates that even if I don’t say ‘*dakara*’ here, he is a bastard. As shown in (23d), *dakara* by itself cannot be denied. These examples suggest that *dakara* is used as a linguistic representation, rather than as a conceptual one. In other words, these are cases of ‘mention’ of *dakara* (for the use/mention distinction, see Sperber and Wilson, 1981). The utterance containing *dakara* in (23b) really communicates: (a) that *dakara* indicates that the utterance that follows it is a faithful interpretation of the preceding utterance; (b) that one of the likely candidates for the interpretation of the utterance ‘He left you’ is that he didn’t
love you; (c) however, what I want to say is that even if I use ‘dakara’ here, it does not introduce the representation that he didn’t love you as the interpretation of the utterance ‘He left you’. The utterance introduced by dakara in (23c) can be interpreted along these lines. Thus, the use of dakara in (23b) and (23c) cannot be counted as evidence for its compositionality. This view is also supported by the fact that there are other discourse connectives which are often used as hedges in a similar environment to (23a) and (23b), some of which are illustrated in the following examples where the connectives are followed by ‘to iu (say that)’:

(24) a. ‘Sorede (therefore)’
   to iu wake dewa nai ga,…
   that say the-case is not but
   ‘I shouldn’t really use “therefore” here, but . . . .’

b. ‘Sikasi (but)’
   to iu no mo nannda ga,…
   that say NOM too questionable but
   ‘I shouldn’t really say “but” here, but . . . .’

c. ‘Soreni (moreover)’
   to itte wa nannda ga,…
   that say TOP questionable but
   ‘I shouldn’t really say “moreover” here, but . . . .’

In such cases, with the focus particle koso being the only candidate to support its compositionality, one has to conclude that dakara does not really share that property.

What about the existence of conceptual counterparts of dakara? Here, I offer alternatives in which all the examples of dakara discussed above are replaced by the phrase ‘betsu no kotoba de iu to (If I put it in other words)’. Here, utterances considered unusual are marked with ‘(?)’, those considered unacceptable are marked with ‘?’, and those considered uninterpretable are marked with ‘??’:

(1) Taro: Let’s go to the lake.
    Mariko: You don’t have a vehicle.
    Taro: I have a bicycle. Betsu no kotoba de iu to, I have a vehicle.

(2) (?) I don’t have the key. Betsu no kotoba de iu to, we can’t get into the house through the door.

(3) Mariko: The adulterous Oxford Don was murdered at home last night.
    Taro: The wife is always the first suspect in these cases.
    Mariko: His wife was in Paris when he was murdered. Betsu no kotoba de iu to, she couldn’t have done it.

(4) Mariko: There are so few trains to and from my station and there is no bus service from the station to my street which is rather distant . . .
    Taro: Betsu no kotoba de iu to, you want to say that you need a car, right?

(5) Taro: Are you free on next Saturday?
    Mariko: I have to see my hairstylist.
Taro: Today, I was given two tickets for the men’s final at Wimbledon. 

Betsu no kotoba de iu to, why don’t you cancel your appointment?

[Mariko and Taro are stuck in a traffic jam]

?? Mariko: Betsu no kotoba de iu to, I said we should go by train.

[Mother always checks if her son is doing homework]

Mother: Are you doing your homework?

?? Son: Betsu no kotoba de iu to, I am doing it now.

A: What are you cooking?
B: Sparrow tongues with anchovies.

A: What?

? B: Betsu no kotoba de iu to, Sparrow tongues with anchovies.

Mariko: Let’s meet at the usual place.

Taro: At the usual place?

Mariko: Betsu no kotoba de iu to, at the back gate

President: I wasn’t there when the decision was made.

Chairman: What does that mean?

President: Betsu no kotoba de iu to, I am not responsible.

Mariko: I will go with you, after all.

Taro: You can’t. We are going to talk about business.

Mariko: Who are you going to see?

? Taro: Betsu no kotoba de iu to, a business colleague.

[Mother has repeatedly told her daughter, Keiko, not to go to a certain club late night]

Mother: Keiko, you went to that club again yesterday, right?

Keiko: Betsu no kotoba de iu to?

These alternative phrasings demonstrate several things. First, the conceptual counterpart of *dakara* can successfully replace the connective only in some of the cases. This suggests that *dakara* is not a synonymous equivalent to ‘Betsu no kotoba de iuto (If I put in other words)’. Second, in the cases where the conceptual counterpart fails to replace *dakara*, there is a common factor involved in interpreting the *dakara*-utterances. In most of these cases, the source representations of the *dakara*-utterance include mental representations. The utterances introduced by *dakara* in examples (6) and (7) are the clearest cases. In (6), the *dakara*-utterance interpretively represents the speaker’s own thoughts, and in (7) *dakara* introduces an utterance which metarepresents the hearer’s thought. On the other hand, there are cases such as (2), (11), and probably (5), where the replacement fails possibly because the utterance introduced by *dakara* interpretively resembles a contextual implication of the source representation, which is a mental representation, rather than a public representation.

Here, it is useful to bring in Blakemore’s (1996) analysis of reformulation markers. She argues that *in other words* and *that is to say* should be distinguished from discourse connectives such as *so* and *after all* for the following reason. Whereas discourse connectives can be used in non-linguistic contexts, the use of reformulation markers such as *in other words* and *that is to say* are only acceptable in a linguistic or
discourse context. Here are her examples of the discourse connective used in non-linguistic contexts:

(25) a. [The speaker notices a blackbird singing outside]
    So spring is here.

b. [The speaker takes an extremely large slice of cake]
    After all, it is my birthday.

(Blakemore, 1996: 337–338)

As can be seen, dakara’s conceptual counterpart, ‘Betsu no kogoba de iuto (If I put it in other words)’, behaves very similarly to English reformulation markers, which are analyzed as encoding conceptual information. By contrast, dakara behaves like English discourse connectives so and after all, in that it can be used in non-linguistic contexts. As clearly shown in the examples of utterances introduced by dakara discussed earlier, dakara can be used when the source representation is implicit and only contextually provided.

Obviously, the replacement fails in example (8) for a different reason. Here, the dakara-utterance is used to manifest an identical representation to the source representation. Unlike its conceptual counterpart, dakara can introduce interpretive representations of different degrees. The cases of repetition and restatement are the extreme cases of interpretive resemblance.

On the basis of these observations, I suggest that dakara encodes procedural information rather than conceptual information. Thus, the semantics of dakara can be summarized as follows: like the English reformulation markers in other words and that is to say, dakara contributes to the higher-level explicatures of the utterance; however, unlike these markers, it encodes procedural information and can be used in non-linguistic contexts, as can so and after all.

A crucial question now is what kind of procedural information dakara encodes. Recall that Blakemore suggested that English reformulation markers conceptually encode the following information:

(21) The speaker believes that P is a faithful representation of a thought Q.

On the basis of (21), I would like to suggest that dakara encodes procedural information such as the following:

(26) Identify a (set of) representation(s) which interpretively resembles P.

In other words, dakara encodes procedural information to instruct the hearer to search for and identify another (set of) representation(s) which the utterance introduced by dakara interpretively resembles. Having identified the source representation(s) and how they resemble each other, the hearer is then in a position to construct appropriate higher-level explicatures, which may include the following:

(27) a. The speaker believes that P is a logical implication of Q.
b. The speaker believes that $P$ is a contextual implication of $Q$

c. The speaker believes that $P$ is a consequence of $Q$.

d. The speaker believes that $P$ shares all the implications with $Q$.

Note here that higher-level explicatures are seen as developments or enrichments of the base-level explication; and the question of how rich these representations should/can be is an empirical issue. However, on this point, relevance theory predicts that they should only be rich enough to yield the expected level of cognitive effects. Thus, if *dakara* is used to connect two abstract propositions, as in our example (1), the higher-level explicatures of the utterance introduced by *dakara* may include something like (27a). On the other hand, if *dakara* is used to connect two propositions describing states of affairs, as in (2), the higher-level explicatures of the utterance introduced by *dakara* may include both (27b) and (27c). Finally, if *dakara* is used to introduce an utterance which repeats the previous utterance, as in (8), a higher-level explicature such as (27d) might be constructed.

5. Final remarks

In this paper, I have developed a cognitive and unitary account of *dakara*, in which the notion of interpretive resemblance plays an essential role in integrating the seemingly polysemous behavior of the connective. As illustrated in the examples presented, the connective can be used in different discourse environments. It connects two or more abstract propositions, two or more propositions which describe states of affairs, two or more utterances, two or more assumptions, and various mixtures of (some of) these different types of representations. The main claim of this paper has been that the notion of interpretive resemblance, which refers to the relation between all types of metarepresentations, cross-cutting the explicit-implicit distinction, can capture all these combinations.

I have also shown that *dakara* has very little capacity for compositionality and have concluded that it is better analyzed as encoding procedural information concerning interpretive resemblance. And I have proposed that, unlike the procedural information encoded by English discourse connectives such as *so* and *therefore*, which contribute to the implicit side of communication, the particular procedural information encoded by *dakara* contributes to the explicit side of communication by constraining the types of higher-level explicatures to be developed. This analysis can also capture the native speaker’s intuition that *dakara* seems to contribute to the truth-conditions of an utterance, especially when it is used to connect two propositions that both describe states of affairs.

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Appendix

(1) Taro:  *Mizuuni ni ikoo.*
lake to go-let’s
‘Let’s go to the lake’
Mariko:  0 *norimono ga nai jyanai.*
(You) vehicle NOM lack isn’t-it
‘You don’t have a vehicle’.
Taro:  0 *jitensha ga aru. Dakara, 0 norimowara aru.*
(I) bicycle NOM is so/in other words (I) vehicle TOP is
‘I have bicycle. So/In other words, I have a vehicle.’

(2) [Mariko says to Taro]
0 *kagi o mottenaiwa. Dakara, doa o akete ie ni*
(I) key ACC have not SF. so/in other words door ACC open house into
*hairu koto wa dekinai wa.* enter NOMZ TOP can-do-not SF
‘I don’t have the key. So/In other words, we can’t get into the house through the door’

(3) Mariko:  *Sakuban,uwakishoo no okkusuhodo no don ga jitaku de*
last night adulterous GEN Oxford GEN Don NOM home LOC
*korosareta wa.* was-murdered SF
‘The adulterous Oxford Don was murdered at home last night.’
Taro:  *Sooiu baai wa itumo okusan ga saisho no yoogisha da.*
such case TOP always wife NOM first GEN suspect COP
‘The wife is always the first suspect in these cases.’
Mariko:  *Kare no okusan wa kare ga korosareta toki, pari ni ita no.*
he GEN wife TOP he NOM was-murdered when Paris LOC were SF
*Dakara kanojiyo wa dekinakatta wa.*
so/in other words she TOP could-not SF
‘His wife was in Paris when he was murdered. So/In other words, she couldn’t have done it.’

(4) Mariko:  *Densha no honsuu wa sukunai si, eki kara tookute basu mo*
train GEN numbers TOP little and station from far bus too
*nai si...*
isn’t and
‘There are so few trains to and from my station and there is no bus service from the station to my street which is rather distant.’

Taro: Dakara, kuruma ga hituyoo to iu wake ka.
so/in other words, car NOM need QUO say case Q
‘So/In other words, you want to say that you need a car, right?’

(5) Taro: Raishuu no doyoobi no gogo, aiteru?
next week GEN Saturday GEN afternoon are-free
‘Are you free next Saturday afternoon?’

Mariko: Biyooin ni ikanakutewaranai wa.
hairstylist LOC go-have-to SF
‘I have to see my hairstylist.’

Taro: Kyoo, uinburudon no dansi kesshousen no ken o ni- mai
today Wimbledon GEN male final-match GEN ticket ACC 2-COUNT morattanda. Dakara, yoyaku o torikesanai ka?
was-given so/in other words, appointment ACC cancel-would-you Q
‘Today, I was given two tickets for the men’s final at Wimbledon. So/In other words, why don’t you cancel your appointment?’

(6) [Mariko and Taro are stuck in a traffic jam]
Mariko: Dakara 0 densha de ikou to itta no yo.
so/therefore (I) train by let’s-go QUO say SF SF
‘This is why I said we should go by train.’

(7) [Mother always checks if her son is doing homework]
Mother: 0 shukudai yatteru no?
(you) homework are-doing SF
‘Are you doing your homework?’

Son: Dakara, 0 ima yatteru.
so/therefore (I) now am-doing
‘Can’t you see? I am doing it now.’

(8) Mariko: 0 nani o tukutteru no?
(you) what ACC are-cooking SF
‘What are you cooking?’

Taro: ‘Sparrow tongues with anchovies’

Mariko: 0 nan te?
(you) what HEAR
‘What?’

Taro: Dakara, ‘Sparrow tongues with anchovies’
as-I-said
‘Like I said, Sparrow tongues with anchovies’

(9) Mariko: Itumo no tokoro de aou.
usual GEN place LOC let’s-meet
‘Let’s meet at the usual place.’
Taro: *Itumo no tokoro?*
usual GEN place
‘At the usual place?’
Mariko: *Dakara, uramon de.*
you know/in other words backgate LOC
‘You know/in other words, at the back gate.’

(10) President: *Ketudan ga kudasareta tokini wa watasi wa inakatta*
decision NOM was-made when TOP I TOP was-not
‘I wasn’t there when the decision was made.’
Chairman: *Sore wa dooiu imi desu ka?*
that TOP what meaning COP Q
‘What does that mean?’
President: *Dakara, watasi ni wa sekinin wa nai.*
that-is, I to TOP responsibility TOP is-not
‘It means I am not responsible’.

(11) Mariko: *Yappri, isshoni iku.*
after-all, together go
‘I will go with you, after all.’
Taro: *Dame da. Sigoto no hanasi o suru kara.*
impossible COP business GEN talk ACC do because
‘You can’t. We are going to talk about business.’
Mariko: *Dare to au no?*
who with meet SF
‘Who are you going to see?’
Taro: *Dakara, sigoto no nakama.*
you-know business GEN colleague
‘Can’t you see? A business colleague.’

(12) [Mother has repeatedly told her daughter, Keiko, not to go to a
certain club late night]
Mother: *Keiko, kinoo mata ano kurabu ni 0 itta deshoo?*
yesterday again that club LOC (you) went didn’t-you
‘Keiko, you went to that club again yesterday, right?’
Daughter: *Dakara?*
so
‘So?’

References
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